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Published on:

27th Aug 2025

Disputed Truth at the Pentagon: Mr. Non Grata on Problem Solving & Human Resistance

đź“ť Show Notes / Description

Episode Summary

In this episode of Mr. Non Grata, Bill Alderson welcomes psychology expert Kim Mueller to explore one of the most difficult paradoxes in organizational life: why people often resist the very truth that could solve their biggest problems.

Drawing from Bill’s extraordinary experience — including his role in restoring Pentagon communications after 9/11 — this episode dives into a case where a 45-second intermittent outage plagued over 10,000 users at the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Despite unlimited resources, the problem went unresolved for more than a year. Why? Because of human dynamics: ego, fear, secrecy, and relationships hidden beneath the surface.

Together, Bill and Kim unpack:

  • ⚡ Disputed truth — why leaders and teams sometimes avoid answers they don’t want to hear.
  • 🧠 The psychology of denial — from self-preservation to ego defense mechanisms.
  • 🕵️ Problem-solver resistance — how outside experts become “Mr. Non Grata” even when they bring critical solutions.
  • đź”’ The Pentagon case study — how organizational compartmentalization, secrecy, and personal dynamics delayed a fix for over a year.
  • đź’ˇ Leadership lessons — building a “no-fault” culture where truth is welcomed, not hidden.

This episode is a powerful reminder that every technology problem is also a human problem.

If you’ve ever felt unwelcome after fixing something big, or wondered why teams sabotage their own solutions, this conversation will resonate deeply.

Transcript
Bill Alderson:

Welcome to another episode of Mr.

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Non Grata.

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I, Bill Alderson, am none other than Mr.

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Non Grata.

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And since I started this series,

I've talked with a number of

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people who've listened to it.

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And they call me up and

say, Bill, I've been Mr.

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Non Grata in so many situations.

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This is really interesting.

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My last job, I became Mr.

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Non Grata.

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I became not welcome or unwelcome.

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After I did a whole bunch of really great

things for an organization, I became Mr.

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Non Grata, just like you're talking about.

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So it's not an isolated situation.

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And I'm not the only Mr.

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Non Grata.

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You could be Mr.

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Nongrata.

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Maybe you and I know one

another from the past.

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Maybe we worked on a problem together.

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Critical problem, high

visibility, high stakes issue.

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Maybe you'd like to be on the podcast.

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Talk about your perspective of

how you or someone else was Mr.

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Nongrata.

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And of course, I refer to Mr.

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Nongrata As a person, could

be female, could be male.

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And, as a way of introduction,

I have with me Kim Mueller.

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And I'll let her talk about

her educational background and

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experience in the area of psychology.

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Because as we unravel these stories, true

stories, About how people can become Mr.

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Non Grata as they are trying to

uncover high visibility, high stakes

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problems to find disputed truth.

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Ooh, disputed truth.

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That's what my whole life's work has been

about, is discovering disputed truth.

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And you would think that if

it were merely an IT or a data

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problem, We'd be in good shape.

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But it's never just an

IT or a data problem.

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It becomes a human problem.

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And that's why I asked Kim Mueller to

sit down with us and talk about why

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would people not want to know the truth?

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Because there are times where people

do not want to know the truth.

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And I can quote chapter and verse.

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Name and date, where people

did not want the truth.

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Now, I'm pretty diplomatic.

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I don't go around accusing

individuals in particular.

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And some of these stories, you

may know who I'm talking about.

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I can never confirm nor deny.

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I have worked with NSA.

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I've worked with FBI.

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I've worked with CIA.

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I've worked extensively with DOD.

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I've worked with police departments, I've

worked with county, local, you name it.

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I have worked with all of these type of

situations from 911 dispatch systems that

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were broken to intelligence systems that

were broken in Iraq and Afghanistan and

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throughout the world for DoD biometrics.

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I'm no stranger to some of these problems.

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And today, we're going to go over a

particular problem, but as I said, I

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just wanted to introduce Kim Mueller

and let her talk a little bit and maybe

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respond to this topic of why don't

people want to know the truth at times.

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Anyway, Kim, welcome to the show.

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Kim Mueller: Thank you, Bill.

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Thanks for having me today.

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I think you're probably asking

the million dollar question.

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Why do people not want to know the truth?

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So I'm interested in hearing

what you have to say today and

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engaging in this conversation.

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As you mentioned, my background is

psychology, not technical person by

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training or by heart or by nature.

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I have a degree in clinical psychology

and I've worked in the behavioral

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health field the majority of my career.

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Although, in the last decade or so, I

have crossed the border into the IT world,

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just a bit, given the need for electronic

health records, even in behavioral health.

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So I have a little taste of the

IT world, but my background and my

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way of thinking is really rooted in

psychology, why people do what they

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do, why people think what they think.

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Bill Alderson: In your experience,

have you encountered various diagnoses

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of people who may not be in the IT

field, but in other types of fields

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and discovered somewhat ironic

behavior when it comes to whether they

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wanted to know or not know the truth.

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We all have these as a person.

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We, We can't convict ourselves,

even, of certain things.

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And we don't always want to know the

whole truth and nothing but the truth,

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because it might crush us if we really

knew the truth even about ourselves.

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Kim Mueller: Absolutely.

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By nature, we as humans have a

tendency towards self preservation.

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And that doesn't just mean

preserving our physical.

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Being, but our emotional well being, our

pride, the things that make us who we are.

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And so it's not really surprising when

you think about it, that if a truth

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is going to out that someone isn't

really who they're supposed to be,

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or who they've led people to think

they are, if the truth will out that,

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then they're gonna be very reluctant

to want to go where that truth is.

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Bill Alderson: Interestingly, today's

situation is a very high stakes, very high

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visibility situation, and we're going to

see some of those human characteristics

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in the story that I will tell.

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And I'll just tell you right now, this

is absolutely 100 percent the truth.

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Nothing added and nothing taken away.

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So in 2001, most people know that

I was called to the Pentagon to

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help them recover communications

immediately following the 9 11 disaster.

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I was standing in my driveway and I got

a phone call and I answered my cell phone

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and it was a Pentagon general asking me to

bring Myself and my team to the Pentagon

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to help them recover communications

because they had moved a few hundred

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servers that were getting water damaged.

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Obviously there's all sorts of things.

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Some things were completely disaster.

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Um, were a disaster and destroyed.

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Other things were just

starting to get wet.

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So they moved all the servers.

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physically out of those

locations and into other areas.

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And they asked me to come and help them

reroute network, reroute firewalls,

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reroute all of these different systems

and troubleshoot all the problems

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that related so that they could bring

the Pentagon back up and so that

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everyone could communicate effectively.

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So I got that call and that's

pretty much what I do today.

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I help people, technologists

and other leaders.

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Be ready to receive that call.

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That's my mantra.

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That's my whole focus.

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That's my opus, is to help other

people be ready to receive that

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high visibility, high stakes call.

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Or, maybe it's just the call that they

get from their own local organizations.

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Or their locale.

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Nevertheless, it's a critical problem.

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So I'm helping people get

ready to get that call and be

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able to respond effectively.

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And it's not only from a technical level.

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I obviously, most people know

that I'm a packet person.

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My handle is packetman007.

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I have been analyzing computer

network packets since:

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Lockheed Missiles and Space Company.

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And looking at packets and trying

to diagnose problems from the

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packet level, which means the

very core of all functions today.

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Every security function in the world

first has an interloper trying to get in,

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and they try and get in with a packet.

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And once they're in, whether

they've elevated a privilege or

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gotten into an API, Or, done SQL

injection, it doesn't matter.

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There's packet evidence.

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Whether it's on the way in, or whether

it's on the way out, it's a packet.

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The fundamentals of security

start with a packet getting in.

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And end with a packet getting

out of the wrong information.

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So that's my worldview is packets.

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So when there's a problem,

that's the perspective.

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I take the fundamental approach

of looking at the packets.

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Do you know that within a security

breach that the hackers, once they

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get in, did you know that they can

turn off all those logs that all those

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security experts are pouring over?

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Yeah.

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All those logs, that they spend,

Millions of dollars trying to go

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through all those logs to find

out what the hackers were doing.

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Do you know that they

can turn off those logs?

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But yet, the packets of them getting

in, the packets of them laterally moving

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over, the packets of them exfiltrating

the data, they can't hide those packets.

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Packets are the fundamental building

block of everything in security.

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At the beginning and at the end.

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So whether it's an API that has been

violated, a service that's been violated,

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a privilege that's been elevated,

a SQL injection, it doesn't matter.

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It starts with a packet

and it ends with a packet.

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But here's the warning.

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Hackers hide, delete those packets.

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It's files of the logs.

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They delete the logs, all the

breadcrumbs, but they cannot delete the

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packets that actually did the damage.

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And so that's why packets are the

fundamental of all cybersecurity

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diagnosis at the beginning and at the end.

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It

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Kim Mueller: sounds a little

bit like when you're talking

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about a medical problem per se.

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And you have definitive physical evidence.

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In your case, the definitive

evidence is in the packets.

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Bill Alderson: Yeah, it's in the packets.

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So you hear about all these

people talking about privilege

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elevation all these various things.

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Those are security things that we

need to be looking at, but it starts

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with the packet getting in and it

ends with a packet getting out.

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So we need to have security experts that

are focused on the true forensics at

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the root level that hackers cannot hide.

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They can't hide the

packets of them getting in.

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of lateraling around and

getting access to the data and

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finally exfiltrating that data.

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Kim Mueller: Sounds like you can

follow them pretty much wherever

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they go and regardless of why.

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Bill Alderson: Yeah, it doesn't matter

whether it's a good packet or a good

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transaction or a bad transaction.

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The issue is that looking at all those

packets is like boiling the ocean.

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There are, billions and

billions of packets.

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It's knowing when to look,

where to look, why to look.

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And find those breadcrumbs that

criminals are leaving behind.

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It's a criminal case.

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It's why we call it Network Forensics.

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So anyway, I want to get on to the

problem that we're going to talk about

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today, which is pretty interesting.

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The Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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Their organization has well

over 10, 000 users in OSD,

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Office of Secretary of Defense.

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The CIO of the Office of Secretary

of Defense, or OSD, was one of

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the directors of the Pentagon.

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When I went in 2001 and this problem

happened a few years later after

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we had recovered the communications

and some things were improved.

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I'll talk about how the Pentagon

was improved after 9 11.

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Which led to actually some of the

circumstances of this problem that

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we're going to talk about today.

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So when the Pentagon was hit, it took

down a lot of critical situations,

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a lot of critical communications.

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It didn't hit at the

worst possible location.

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As a matter of fact, we were

pretty lucky because it hit a part

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of the Pentagon that was the U.

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S.

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Army's area of the Pentagon, and

it was, they call them wedges.

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And it had just been rebuilt.

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Reinforced concrete a lot

of new infrastructure, and

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a lot of reinforcement.

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So that where the aircraft hit, it

didn't go all the way through and

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onto the other side of the Pentagon.

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It pretty much stayed in that one wedge.

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But it went almost all the way into the

center, where I used to go and have lunch.

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Very interesting the whole situation.

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But nevertheless, we recovered

communications, and then a couple of

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years later, I got a call from the guy

who used to run the Pentagon network, and

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now he's the Secretary of Defense's OSD,

and he's in charge, he's the CIO of OSD,

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or Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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So I come in, and he says, Bill, I've

got another one for ya, and it's a doozy.

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For the past 13 months, after we've done

a lot of renovations, PINRIN was the

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name of the organization that renovated

the Pentagon after actually they were,

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they had just renovated, PINRIN had just

renovated the Army's part of the network,

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or the Army's part of the wedge that

I told you about had been reinforced.

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And thankfully a lot of people

hadn't yet moved in because it was

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recently renovated and that's why

we didn't lose quite as many people.

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It was a little over a couple of

hundred, not, several thousand.

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There's various times the Pentagon

houses somewhere between 22, 000 to

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30, 000 people and they're all in these

office buildings and so if you take

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one fifth of the Pentagon, it would

have been one fifth of the Pentagon

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pretty much that would have been killed

had everything been up to top levels.

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So it's, probably about 8,

000 people would have died.

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Had it not been for the renovation and

the fact that they hadn't all moved in.

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So anyway, they moved

all these servers, right?

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And now, we've got this problem.

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But before we get into that problem, I

want to just allow you to maybe think

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about it a little bit and maybe react to,

when there is a mission critical problem.

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High visibility, high stakes.

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Over 10, 000 users, The situation

was every day, haphazardly, nobody

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knew when, the whole network

would go down for 45 seconds.

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Now the Pentagon has more

than just the Pentagon.

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They have outlying buildings in

other locations in the regional area.

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They have other buildings

that are part of them.

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And they have very high speed

fiber, dark fiber between all those

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buildings in order to Basically

run everything, but the Pentagon

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is the central communications hub.

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But a couple of times a day for

the last 13 months, 45 second

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outages haphazard during the day.

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Now why would an organization suffer who

had massive amounts of budget, unlimited

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money, the smartest and best people,

The smartest and best vendors, why

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would they not solve this problem that

they've been suffering for 13 months?

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Do you have any ideas?

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Do you have any, what goes on?

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What are people saying to themselves?

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What are leaders saying to themselves?

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What are the technologists

saying to themselves?

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Kim Mueller: I think that at

multiple levels, you have the ego

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of many people involved, right?

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Personalities.

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These are one level,

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you have the personalities of people at

all different levels, in the military.

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And when you look at military rankings

and such, it's not unusual that you

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would have people at certain higher ranks

that may have some personality traits,

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a little bit on the narcissistic side.

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And you may have people in lower

level positions that have more

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inferiority kinds of personalities

and lack some self confidence.

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So you've got people at all

of these different levels.

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And it sounds like the problem

they had is, as you said, how

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could you let a problem like this

go on for this amount of time

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. No one wants to admit that

the problem is theirs.

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Typically what happens when you have

a problem, whether it's a technology

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problem or any other kind of problem,

everybody wants to point their finger at

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the other side, that normally happens.

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Bill Alderson: Or at least they want

to say, it's not my problem, I've

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looked everywhere, it's not my problem.

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Kim Mueller: It's got

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Bill Alderson: to be somewhere else.

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Kim Mueller: Exactly.

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And the users, I think that, they suffer

from what we know as learned helplessness.

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They stop reporting.

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They just stop reporting.

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I, I'm not going to waste my

time reporting a problem that's

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been happening for, as you said,

not months, near over a year

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. So you've got users.

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who are no longer even reporting that it's

a problem, and you've got people who may

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or may not be a part of the problem who

are so busy identifying that it's somebody

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else's, they're not really taking the

time To literally look at the realities

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of what if they did something wrong.

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And then you have the people who,

are at the top, who don't even really

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want to admit there's a problem.

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Because if there's a problem in my

house, and I'm the director of my

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house, if I'm a high ranking officer,

then ultimately, it falls back on me.

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Bill Alderson: One of the things,

Kim, that I should add is that this

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problem took them completely down for

45 seconds, two or three times a day,

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but it didn't take them down completely.

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And everyone who reported it, one

person would say it was 30 seconds,

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another one would say it was a minute,

another one would say it's 33 seconds.

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There was no definitive symptom or

diagnosis and it was all somewhat

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hearsay and they were, they all knew that

something was happening intermittently.

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So an intermittent problem often is the

worst kind and for me, as a technologist,

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it's one of the worst kinds too because

I have to instrument in order to catch

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it and like I said, catching all those

packets is like boiling the ocean.

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And it's difficult.

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So you have to use.

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A Swiss Army knife

approach to the problem.

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Kim Mueller: And then you have,

as a part of that problem and

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feeding into that problem, you

have all different kinds of people.

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As you said, there are technology

problems, but every technology problem,

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ultimately, technology doesn't run itself

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. People are involved.

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Human beings.

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One human being who has, is

having a marital problem at home.

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Another human being who maybe has some

health issues and missed a lot of work.

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There are so many things going on in the

humans that touch these technologies.

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And in order for them to get to the root

cause of something like an intermittent

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problem, If it wasn't taking everything

down, and it was happening, there wasn't

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anything obvious pointing to where it

was, I'm sure it was really easy to just,

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oh that can't be this, that can't be

that, and, you could put it off somewhere

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else, because there wasn't any direct

line to follow to, It's you, or it's

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yours, or it's this department, sounds

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Bill Alderson: the other thing

is, the military is excellent at

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what we call compartmentalization.

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There, when I was there for

9 11, there are well over, I

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believe we counted 125 enclaves.

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That means different networks.

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So you think Joint Chiefs, Army, Air

Force, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, right?

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Where you think the five

main services, right?

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There are within those services.

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OSD is yet another one.

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Office of Secretary of Defense

is above all of those others.

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So if you start counting all of the

different computer networks within this

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system, there's, there was like over 125.

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And some of those different networks

were affected and some were not.

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Most affected was those 10,

000 plus users of the Office

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of Secretary of Defense or OSD.

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And the CIO of OSD, I had met a few

years back, and he called me and said,

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Bill let's figure out, do you think

you can figure out where this is?

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Due to compartmentalization, and

due to the fact that it's spread

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out the, it wasn't, the Pentagon is

one of the biggest office buildings

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in the world, so it's pretty big.

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And, but in addition to that, it has

tentacles that go out to buildings all

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around in the area and that becomes

part of the Pentagon's network.

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So there's just this enormous, this

enormity and this complexity that occurs.

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And then you have you have a

group that's responsible for

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the fiber optic of the Pentagon.

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You have a group that's response,

so that's the physical layer.

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You have a group that's the

construction part of the

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Pentagon, who puts in new cabling.

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You have all of these different segmented

entities, and then you have PenRen, which

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is Pentagon Renovations, which are tearing

apart another wedge of the Pentagon,

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and remodeling it and rebuilding it.

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And these are more construction people.

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After 9 11, there was a freeway

that went directly right by.

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You could throw a rock at

the Pentagon on the freeway.

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Penryn Pentagon Renovations wrote the

check to move that freeway over quite

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a bit, about a quarter of a mile away.

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So consequently, there were a lot of

changes that happened and PenRen was a

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very powerful organization and spent,

billions renovating and continues

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to renovate the Pentagon today.

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It's still an organization.

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So when you look at the Pentagon,

it's much more than just

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Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine.

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It's the procurement arm of the Pentagon.

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It's the political arm of all

of those different things.

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All of the real forces

who actually, defend us.

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are not at the Pentagon.

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It's only leadership and procurement

predominantly and policy that

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comes out of the Pentagon.

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And that's 25, 000 people.

371

:

So it's a very complex web of technology,

of people, of compartmentalization.

372

:

And so then I come in and it's

why do they want a guy like me?

373

:

Cause I ended up with some experience

in the Pentagon, helping them

374

:

recover communications in the

Pentagon at 9 11, so I was uniquely

375

:

prepared and I have wide shoulders.

376

:

And a constitution that allows me to

get in there and figure things out.

377

:

And that's what I do.

378

:

Kim Mueller: One of the things that

you mentioned earlier was standing in

379

:

your driveway and getting that call.

380

:

And, of course, the Question in my mind

was What's going through your mind when

381

:

you get that call, and you were going

into, flying into a place where most

382

:

people weren't even allowed to go, right?

383

:

This was right after 9

11, and here you were.

384

:

So you have your technical expertise,

but, was there also that, that

385

:

human part of you that said, I'm

flying into a danger zone here.

386

:

Bill Alderson: Certainly there is

that, but I I was a Navy man at a young

387

:

age, spent four years, Vietnam era.

388

:

I was not in Vietnam, but I was

very nearby over in Pearl Harbor.

389

:

And that's on a ship.

390

:

And so I was nearby and I had

stood and raised my hand to defend

391

:

and support the constitution of

the United States of America.

392

:

And that is something that everyone under

my voice who is a military member knows.

393

:

That, that never expires.

394

:

So we're predisposed to knowing

that we may move into danger.

395

:

But yeah, the whole world at that time,

going in there at that early moment

396

:

to the Pentagon at 9 11, and we'll

talk about that at another time I just

397

:

wanted to basically set the background

that the reason why I came in to solve

398

:

this problem a couple of years later

was because I helped design some of the

399

:

renovations and my reports and that sort

of thing about how we fix some things.

400

:

So I want to go into a

little bit of the technology.

401

:

And one of the things that you

should know is that we learned

402

:

a lot of lessons at 9 11.

403

:

We learned that you probably want to

have more incoming and outgoing lines.

404

:

We don't want to have, we want

some redundancy in multiple ways.

405

:

And then also what happens if all of

our backups and everything were in

406

:

the Pentagon and it gets hit again?

407

:

Then we are susceptible to a

single point of failure yet again.

408

:

After the Pentagon was renovated yet

again in order to recover from the 9 11

409

:

disaster they, We took and built secondary

locations for, remember I told you

410

:

there's about 125 different institutions

in there, 125 different enclaves.

411

:

They all had a mission, and the

mission, it could be could be stopped.

412

:

If they hit the center point or single

point of failure, which is a Pentagon.

413

:

So they said, we probably

better have backup sites for

414

:

all of our people to go to.

415

:

And they had to design those in and

over a hundred miles away and in

416

:

diverse locations, they put secondary

facilities, but believe it or not the

417

:

problem that I was troubleshooting

had to do somewhat with that new.

418

:

Data Redundancy.

419

:

Because when you would go File, Save, and

it would store on the local file server

420

:

your file, or your database, or what have

you, that data would save at the Pentagon.

421

:

Simultaneously, it would

save and it would save.

422

:

At that new alternate site

that they put out there.

423

:

And that was the difference from

when I was there at 9 11 and when

424

:

I was there a couple of years

later to solve this problem.

425

:

So I knew all these different things

were happening and we use these

426

:

giant Which is now Dell EMC, but

these EMC data storage devices.

427

:

And we had them in the Pentagon, and then

we had them out in all those alt sites.

428

:

Then we had very high

speed, links to all of them.

429

:

And when you, the, some of the

definitions of the problem was I saved

430

:

a file, or I did a database store, And

it's stored at the Pentagon and then

431

:

all of a sudden everything stopped.

432

:

So there's various technologies that are

what we call synchronous or asynchronous.

433

:

And that's how some of this

technology of data storage would work.

434

:

You'd save it to the Pentagon storage

so that you could retrieve it.

435

:

But simultaneously.

436

:

You would save it at the alternate site.

437

:

Kim Mueller: A backup, so to speak.

438

:

Bill Alderson: Backup in two ways.

439

:

It operated as a backup for data,

but it also operated if something

440

:

happened at the Pentagon, all the, all

those employees or another group who

441

:

are responsible for that part of the

mission would have to be relocated.

442

:

Because if the building is like,

it's a big office building, right?

443

:

So if part of the office building

got damaged, they not only had

444

:

to have the people, but also the

data that the people could access.

445

:

If you look at 125 different enclaves,

125 different buildings, different off

446

:

site locations, it was a very complex web.

447

:

And in OSD, if you stored a file,

It would store it to Pentagon, and

448

:

then it would momentarily thereafter

store over in the alt site.

449

:

And there was a problem somewhere in that.

450

:

So we need to go File, Save,

it would stop for 45 seconds.

451

:

It wouldn't store local,

it wouldn't store remote.

452

:

So there were, there was a problem.

453

:

So it had some things

to do with the symmetry.

454

:

of where the data was stored,

whether it was asynchronously

455

:

stored, or synchronously.

456

:

And different types of databases,

different types of systems, have

457

:

different types of requirements for

whether they are stored asynchronously,

458

:

or whether they're stored synchronously.

459

:

Databases, if you get out of step with

your database, you can corrupt it.

460

:

There's some pretty sensitive pieces,

and I don't want to go into all the

461

:

different technological purposes and

reasons for that, but there are, if

462

:

you store a file on your computer and

then store it to a USB drive, it really

463

:

doesn't matter in time frame, that doesn't

really matter, you're backing it up.

464

:

This is simultaneous backup, in real time.

465

:

Going to the Pentagon Network.

466

:

And the Pentagon servers and then

over to the alt site servers.

467

:

And then we have this other

situation with all of this data

468

:

because it's all classified.

469

:

And it's not just classified, it's

classified, for official use only.

470

:

It's classified at the confidential level.

471

:

It's classified at the secret level.

472

:

It's classified at the top secret level.

473

:

And then it's classified And, special

access required within each one of those,

474

:

and derivations, and it's separated

depending upon the type of mission.

475

:

Whether it's a, no kidding, a military

mission where they're flying and doing

476

:

something, or whether it's just the

general secretary has the email in order

477

:

to get the commands going between places.

478

:

There's the tactical part of the

Systems, and then there is the office

479

:

automation part of the systems.

480

:

But I'm here to tell you that if we

don't have the office automation part

481

:

of the systems, a lot of the command

and control is somewhat impacted.

482

:

I mean

483

:

Kim Mueller: I'm curious, Bill, when

you are called into one of these

484

:

situations, and as you said, it

had gone on for a very long time.

485

:

Are the folks locally, where

you're working, are they A bit

486

:

reluctant to give you information?

487

:

Are they excited that you're there?

488

:

What happens when you go

in to solve a problem?

489

:

Bill Alderson: It's always a mix.

490

:

There are some people who are so happy

to see me because they've been trying

491

:

to solve the problem for months or

years and so they know that okay.

492

:

And I'll just admit that a lot of times

I solve problems, not that I solve them,

493

:

but I'm there as the facilitator and I

am the one who gets the, no kidding the

494

:

time, the focus, the resources to focus on

the problem so that it can get resolved.

495

:

It's not always That's me that solves

that problem I facilitate it, but I got

496

:

the opportunity and they didn't, right?

497

:

And so when I go in there, usually

everybody's, we put people on teams and we

498

:

start working and the first thing we do is

try and find out, okay, what's the Let's,

499

:

no kidding, let's get a problem statement.

500

:

Let's make sure it's accurate.

501

:

Let's make sure, it's, and I talk

about this in almost every episode,

502

:

the old adage about blind people

identifying the elephant and one

503

:

person, touches the trunk and he

says, Oh, this is some sort of a hose.

504

:

And the other person touches one of

the legs and it's oh, this is a tree.

505

:

And another person touches the tail and

it's oh, this is a sweep or something.

506

:

And then they touch another part of it,

oh, this is a hairy grizzly bear, right?

507

:

Because it has hair on it in some

places and some places it doesn't.

508

:

And so it's like touching an

elephant and everyone has a

509

:

different a different diagnosis or

a different feeling or a different

510

:

perspective and every single time.

511

:

So the first thing you have to do

is get everybody together and then

512

:

come up with all of the symptoms.

513

:

So one of the best things I think

I learned is to be a listener.

514

:

And you want to make sure you

hear every symptom from everybody.

515

:

And of course, the old woman

who's been there for 50 years and

516

:

is about to retire, doesn't know

really anything about computers.

517

:

She has a perspective.

518

:

And it's usually pretty accurate.

519

:

So you want to listen to

those non technical people and

520

:

their version of the symptoms.

521

:

And then you want to talk to the

people who are running the networks

522

:

or running the servers and you want

to listen to everybody's chronology of

523

:

events and how this Thing just happens

and nobody can ever figure it out.

524

:

And there's finger pointing between

the server team and the router team

525

:

and the switch team and the, and

then, then we have these other things

526

:

because of classification that I

mentioned, encryption and every one of

527

:

those encryption levels is different.

528

:

So you have different encryption

gear for every level of

529

:

certification of classification.

530

:

They have different levels of

rigor that they have to have.

531

:

Consequently it's a

very complex Situation.

532

:

And so it's no wonder that people

in these large environments have

533

:

these type of problems, but I

was fortunate I got to come in.

534

:

I was trusted and I got to come in.

535

:

And so yeah, some people loved

having me come in and somebody,

536

:

some people like, if they'd let me

have all this time and resources and

537

:

focus, I could have solved it too.

538

:

And it's true.

539

:

It's true.

540

:

So one of the reasons why we're doing Mr.

541

:

Non Grata is to help people understand

inside their organizations how to

542

:

perform critical problem resolution

and how to basically dissect the

543

:

anatomy of a critical problem.

544

:

And I go into this in my training

and, and I have a whole methodology

545

:

that I go through when I'm

trying to solve these problems.

546

:

But anyway, so bottom line is every

four, for 45 seconds, every once in a

547

:

while, the whole doggone thing goes down.

548

:

So they have monitoring

systems that cost millions.

549

:

They have diagnostic

tools that cost millions.

550

:

They have people who are operators of all

those tools that are top level experts.

551

:

Here's the thing.

552

:

They could not figure out what the

problem was because they It went across

553

:

enclaves, it went across responsibilities,

it went across classification levels.

554

:

And so all of these things, and few people

have a network documentation system.

555

:

I helped them document the Pentagon.

556

:

After 9 11, I showed them how to do it

and led them into, and I've done that

557

:

for a lot of Fortune 500 companies.

558

:

I go in and say, look, you don't

have the type of documentation that

559

:

you need in order to troubleshoot

this problem or remodel this

560

:

system or modernize this system.

561

:

And just like an architect who

has to have the blueprints of

562

:

the original design I once met.

563

:

I met on a flight in California,

a fellow who was an architect

564

:

for the state of California.

565

:

He happened to be an architect

who was retrofitting the

566

:

universities of California.

567

:

And one of the big problems was he

didn't have all the original blueprints.

568

:

So he didn't know where the iron

was inside those concrete walls.

569

:

He didn't know what the

structure was inside those walls.

570

:

And he was responsible for

doing earthquake retrofitting.

571

:

And without those, what did he have to do?

572

:

He had to spend a lot more money

and a lot more time and energy

573

:

and years on drilling core samples

inside these buildings, inside these

574

:

walls, inside these structures.

575

:

Why?

576

:

To determine what they were built of

so that they could build earthquake

577

:

retrofitting to modernize them.

578

:

And it's the same thing with networks.

579

:

If you don't have a good blueprint of

your network and your systems you're

580

:

really going to run into trouble when

you try to start modifying those.

581

:

And especially now as we

experience the hybrid cloud and

582

:

premises and that sort of thing.

583

:

And but that leads me to.

584

:

When I first went to the Pentagon,

they didn't have any network

585

:

documentation because that system

that held all that was destroyed.

586

:

So we had to reverse engineer the Pentagon

before we could diagnose the problems.

587

:

Okay, so this particular problem,

every 40 every day, a couple of

588

:

times a day, it would go down.

589

:

Everyone is basically

giving me the symptoms.

590

:

And I have to get the

diagnostic information.

591

:

I have to monitor.

592

:

So I monitored with a Swiss

Army Knife like solution.

593

:

I went out to one of their big office

complexes, and I set up my monitoring

594

:

as if I were one of the users.

595

:

And you can't really monitor

everything in Squared.

596

:

You can't boil the ocean.

597

:

So you pick one user, or one little

subset of users, and you monitor them.

598

:

They're going to be indicative of the

45 second outage, just like everyone.

599

:

You don't have to boil the ocean, you

don't have to look at all of them.

600

:

Find one user, or one set of users who

have this problem on a regular basis,

601

:

And monitor their access to the network.

602

:

Sniff the packets at one station.

603

:

You don't have to get

petabytes of packets.

604

:

You just need one representative

person who's having the problem.

605

:

Whether it be application

or what have you.

606

:

But then I also had to monitor.

607

:

Which means I had to, there's a technical

term that we call it a network ping.

608

:

Network ping.

609

:

Or a PING packet, an ICMP, Internet

Control Message Protocol, PING.

610

:

And it's what we use to determine

if there's connectivity or not,

611

:

and how fast the connectivity was.

612

:

And we use Traceroute to find out

what the path of the connectivity was.

613

:

And so we have to use what

I call a Swiss Army Knife.

614

:

Because I couldn't use that

4 million HP OpenView system.

615

:

It wasn't, it didn't look

at that one person's.

616

:

Behavior.

617

:

It looked at this huge network

and they couldn't figure it out.

618

:

Too many alarms happening

at the same time.

619

:

Too many problems

happening at the same time.

620

:

So I went in and said, look, I want

to find this one office location.

621

:

I want to, and then I want to end

everybody in that office because a big

622

:

cubicle area to pipe up when it happens.

623

:

So I know when it happens.

624

:

So I set up monitoring.

625

:

Like a, what you'd call a, what I

call a Swiss Army knife monitor.

626

:

I set up one of the machines

as a monitor to see when it

627

:

had access and when it didn't.

628

:

And I would monitor it

on a very high frequency.

629

:

And I did that from multiple

locations so that if it happened

630

:

over here, but not over here.

631

:

So I figured out how to

instrument the environment without

632

:

spending 4 million on something.

633

:

I did a Swiss Army knife and I said if

this one set of little users here has

634

:

the problem, I'll be able to diagnose it

by capturing their packets at the same

635

:

time that I was also monitoring and I

will have evidence of the monitoring.

636

:

So anyway, I found that

there were these outages.

637

:

I captured a bunch of the packets.

638

:

Oh, we lost connectivity

to this, and this.

639

:

And I said the, and I had

to monitor on two sides.

640

:

I monitored on the server side back

to the client and on the client side

641

:

over to the server simultaneously

so I could see both sides.

642

:

So I was monitoring this way and this way.

643

:

And I found that for some reason

that this one enclave was responsible

644

:

for whatever was the outage was.

645

:

And so when I inquired about that,

it's Oh, that's the encryption enclave.

646

:

That's where they do all the KG

gear and KG encryption is inside,

647

:

so I looked at it from one side.

648

:

Yep, it's a KG area and

from the other side.

649

:

Yep.

650

:

It's a KG area and I said somewhere in

there we're losing connectivity, so they

651

:

didn't want to play ball for some reason.

652

:

Now that's in your area.

653

:

Why, if I give them evidence that

their area is responsible, why

654

:

would they not want to play ball?

655

:

Kim Mueller: It sounds to me like you

might be dealing with a little bit

656

:

issue of cognitive dissonance, where

if your truth doesn't match the truth

657

:

that they have given in their own mind.

658

:

If I believe that the problem is

outside of me, and you're telling me

659

:

the problem is within my area, then

that doesn't compute in my head.

660

:

Bill Alderson: And like I said,

these are different enclaves

661

:

or different responsibilities.

662

:

So the packets would go from the

office area, go in and get stored

663

:

in a certain location, and then

they would have to be encrypted in

664

:

order to go outside the Pentagon.

665

:

And I identified that this encryption

area That was one of the problems and they

666

:

said, Oh you're not clear to that level.

667

:

So very convenient.

668

:

The military and the government often

classifies things so that they can keep

669

:

anybody who's going to find the problem.

670

:

Out of the area, and they use

classification and access.

671

:

Now, a most needed capability.

672

:

I've worked on classified programs,

special access required, and

673

:

compartmentalized stuff all my life.

674

:

But now it's being used against me.

675

:

And I said here's the symptoms, and

I just showed them the data, and

676

:

I said, it's somewhere in there,

and they weren't playing ball.

677

:

Now, I went in to explain this, and they

had a high level meeting in one of these

678

:

big, fancy, mahogany row, boardrooms.

679

:

And there was, I think four or five high

level secure high level, executives.

680

:

Somewhat knowledgeable of IT and

the CIO of the Pentagon was there.

681

:

He was my sponsor.

682

:

And so I'm explaining and showing them

charts and graphs about my monitoring

683

:

and how I instrumented so that I

could set up to show them my work.

684

:

I could show them definitively This

is where the packet went to, and

685

:

this is where it stopped and didn't

come back out, and I monitored the

686

:

other side, and it didn't go out the

other side, and it didn't come back.

687

:

This is the area, this is the

compartmentalization that's

688

:

appropriate, that, and this is

the area where your delay is.

689

:

This is where that 45 second outage is.

690

:

I can't diagnose it because They say

I'm not cleared for that level, and so

691

:

I gave them all the information, and I

said, then you guys are going to have to

692

:

take it on the inside and figure it out.

693

:

They kept contending that they

weren't responsible, and I said this

694

:

is a pretty simple binary issue.

695

:

Packet goes here, 45 seconds.

696

:

I'm sorry, that is it.

697

:

All of a sudden, there's

this guy in this meeting.

698

:

He was the director of Penryn.

699

:

Remember the guy who

wrote the check to move

700

:

Kim Mueller: the

701

:

Bill Alderson: freeway?

702

:

It was that guy.

703

:

Do you think he had a

few friends in the world?

704

:

Yeah.

705

:

Think he's pretty powerful?

706

:

Unequivocally.

707

:

So he yelled at me, in

military term, Stand down!

708

:

Because that area That was something

that his team was responsible for.

709

:

Kim Mueller: Talk about defense mechanism.

710

:

It's like a literal defense mechanism,

and we talk in the psychology world

711

:

about the defense mechanisms that we

use and in this case, they're using, in

712

:

essence, a military defense mechanism,

a stand down, they're Saying that you

713

:

can't go any further because you don't

have the classification to do it.

714

:

Bill Alderson: It wasn't only that.

715

:

It was, I was accusing that area of being

the problem and they weren't cooperating.

716

:

That's why I yelled, stand down.

717

:

Kim Mueller: And then what?

718

:

Bill Alderson: Very interestingly, I had

a friend who He went to the, Annapolis,

719

:

he was a naval officer, and he went to

Annapolis, and he took me out to Annapolis

720

:

while I was there that particular week,

and we chit chatted and it just so

721

:

happened that he had a friend who was

in the CSI of the Navy, I can't remember

722

:

what it, what was, what's it called?

723

:

Kim Mueller: NCIS?

724

:

Bill Alderson: Yeah, NCIS.

725

:

He had a friend in NCIS and they

were trained, they were called

726

:

in, apparently unbeknownst to me,

but how did I end up knowing this?

727

:

But because this friend of mine who

took me over to Annapolis, and by

728

:

the way, he took me to the chapel.

729

:

And in the chapel, at the bottom

of the chapel, is where they

730

:

recovered, from Europe, from a from

an abandoned grave, the bones of

731

:

our first admiral, John Paul Jones.

732

:

Yeah, so if you guys are ever in

Annapolis, definitely go to the

733

:

chapel and go down to the bottom

and they have a crypt there and the

734

:

actual bones retrieved from a from a

cemetery in Europe and we recovered

735

:

those and put them in the chapel.

736

:

The bones of John Paul

Jones, our first Admiral.

737

:

Anyway, while he was showing me all of

this and we were talking about it, he

738

:

said he had this friend who was at NCIS.

739

:

And he was his roommate when he went

to Annapolis, so they were tight.

740

:

And so he was, that was an Inspector

General thing, or NCIS thing anyway.

741

:

And he couldn't tell me

anything, but he knew something.

742

:

And he says, there's a reason why they

don't want you to solve this problem.

743

:

Kim Mueller: Someone's

got something to hide.

744

:

And maybe that something doesn't

even have anything to do with

745

:

what you think you're solving.

746

:

Bill Alderson: Might not

be a technology problem.

747

:

Now, it ended up being a

technology manifestation.

748

:

Come to find out a little later on,

that it was pretty much forced, that

749

:

it was that organization's problem.

750

:

And interestingly, and by the way,

if you are a investigative journalist

751

:

and you want to go back in time and

find this out, more power to you.

752

:

But the then director of Penryn,

three weeks after I left.

753

:

Retired

754

:

unexpectedly.

755

:

Kim Mueller: Could be coincidence.

756

:

But I seem to remember someone once saying

there's no such thing as a coincidence.

757

:

Bill Alderson: And I think that would have

been the guy, Mark Harmon, at NCIS, right?

758

:

Kim Mueller: Exactly.

759

:

Bill Alderson: Okay.

760

:

No such things as coincidence.

761

:

And you would be right.

762

:

And there it is.

763

:

A play on words and a play on things.

764

:

So anyway, come to find out, this

executive had assigned this leader

765

:

over that area of technology.

766

:

And

767

:

That's why he was later.

768

:

I later I learned from my friend who

was Friends with the IG and that sort

769

:

of thing that the woman that he had

assigned responsibility over that area

770

:

that was responsible was his mistress.

771

:

Kim Mueller: And now the human factor.

772

:

Bill Alderson: So what kind of things

do you think were going on there?

773

:

Kim Mueller: Certainly, again,

774

:

we all have a belief of who we

are and who people believe we are.

775

:

There is, there's yourself

as you see yourself.

776

:

And then there's yourself as

you believe others see you.

777

:

And when what others see gets shattered,

then it breaks down the human psyche.

778

:

And I think that's in some of these

situations that you're describing, even

779

:

though it's a technical problem and

really isn't a person's, it doesn't

780

:

change who that person is today or

tomorrow, but because of how our work

781

:

world is organized and how people

value themselves based on their work,

782

:

if what happens in that situation is

that their character gets, basically

783

:

their character gets assassinated.

784

:

Interestingly,

785

:

Bill Alderson: so much for watching.

786

:

I'll see you next time.

787

:

I forced the move.

788

:

The group resisted and

refused to work with me.

789

:

But later I found out, before I left

the Pentagon, we solved the problem.

790

:

Because this woman's entire

team was working 24 hours, 7

791

:

days a week while I was on site.

792

:

Because as I kept narrowing down,

and it kept getting more proof,

793

:

definitive proof, That their area of

responsibility was indeed the cause

794

:

of the 45 second outages haphazardly.

795

:

Kim Mueller: So they needed

to solve it before you did.

796

:

Bill Alderson: Bingo.

797

:

That's one of the dynamics.

798

:

It's

799

:

Kim Mueller: like finding the witness

before you, before the bad guys find them.

800

:

Bill Alderson: Exactly.

801

:

But fortunately, I came in and like I

said, I was able to use my, Swiss Army

802

:

Knife, I was able to do these things

and prove this is where the problem was.

803

:

And when that happened, that

caused this leader to explode in

804

:

front of a lot of other people.

805

:

And like I said, about three

weeks after I left, now this was

806

:

Kim Mueller: Because what he

was hiding was much larger

807

:

than the 45 second outages.

808

:

Bill Alderson: Yes, and they just

didn't want to admit that that her

809

:

responsibility was where the problem was.

810

:

Now, it could have been

a technical problem.

811

:

So what?

812

:

Hey, we found this and that was

the problem and that was And Bill

813

:

identified it as being in that location.

814

:

It was not that they were

the source of the problem.

815

:

That was the problem.

816

:

It was that they were trying

to hide it from others.

817

:

And in that result, it ended up, he yelled

at me to stand down in this big meeting.

818

:

And that escalated the analysis

of, and the investigation that

819

:

was going on about him and.

820

:

This woman that worked for him at a high

level that he oversaw was his mistress.

821

:

It was

822

:

Kim Mueller: So he had, a lot

of guilt going on for what

823

:

was happening in my opinion.

824

:

He had some guilt over the fact that this

was his mistress and, there's this problem

825

:

and he doesn't want any of this found out.

826

:

And, when those kinds of things happen

and anxiety bubbles up you default.

827

:

And what was his default?

828

:

His default was stand down.

829

:

Bill Alderson: So anyway, suffice

it to say, after we were done, they

830

:

did, her group did solve the problem.

831

:

We got it all fixed.

832

:

I was successful once again, thank God.

833

:

And I went off and, but I started

thinking, man, this guy probably wrote

834

:

a lot of checks to a lot of different

people and he had a lot of power.

835

:

And I was Mr.

836

:

Non Grata.

837

:

In a big way, that resulted in his

838

:

retirement.

839

:

I watched my back.

840

:

And I still wonder if there weren't

some things because it was not a pretty

841

:

picture and there were huge consequences.

842

:

And by the way, this

didn't get in the papers.

843

:

Never got in the papers.

844

:

Kim Mueller: Early on when

you were talking about getting

845

:

called in after this problem,

846

:

One of the questions that came

to my mind was the why now?

847

:

Because in the mental health field,

people deal with mental health problems.

848

:

Depression, anxiety, even severe

problems, hallucinations, but when they

849

:

seek help, there's always a why now.

850

:

And so one of the first

questions you ask is, why now?

851

:

Why now?

852

:

And people will say something

very generic, right?

853

:

And then you say, okay, what's changed

in the last 24 hours that made you

854

:

pick up the phone or schedule this

appointment or whatever, right?

855

:

What's the why now?

856

:

And so I'm curious what the why now

of is, why now did you get called in?

857

:

I was

858

:

Bill Alderson: never made

privy to those things.

859

:

However, one can surmise.

860

:

It's the subject of books being

authored on the topic, right?

861

:

All sorts of different things.

862

:

Clandestine, secret situations

inspector general emergency retirements.

863

:

That sort of thing.

864

:

And so my friend had told me

that he knew that there was

865

:

some investigating going on.

866

:

And I think that's how I ended up being

there, because they were desperate

867

:

to solve the problem, but couldn't.

868

:

And I was the one who could prove that.

869

:

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, that

was the area that was the problem.

870

:

And you had

871

:

Kim Mueller: no skin in the game.

872

:

Bill Alderson: I have no skin in the game.

873

:

Kim Mueller: Regarding

whose problem it was.

874

:

I

875

:

Bill Alderson: was from California.

876

:

I got another phone call.

877

:

I just, responded.

878

:

Kim Mueller: Yeah, and they needed

someone from the outside to be able

879

:

to come in, because internally it

sounds like everybody was really you

880

:

talk about a complex network, right?

881

:

It's a complex network of human

beings as well, and relationships.

882

:

And it, I don't care what the

environment is, whether it's the

883

:

military or, a fortune 500 company

or whatever it is, it's made up of

884

:

people, human beings with feelings,

with relationships and with problems.

885

:

Bill Alderson: Said.

886

:

Thank you, Kim, for walking through

this with us and taking a look at,

887

:

some of these complexities that

have been associated with some of

888

:

these high visibility, high stakes

situations that I've been called into.

889

:

I often tell people that

I feel like Forrest Gump.

890

:

I have no idea why I'm the guy who

gets called in on these things.

891

:

But they end up being pretty doggone big.

892

:

And I am just an instrument and

I just go in and do what I do.

893

:

And and it's always

been interesting to me.

894

:

And once in a while, like now during

this podcast, I get to go back and

895

:

discuss these different sorts of

things and bring them to light.

896

:

And of course this is long ago and

probably some people are deceased.

897

:

By this time, and certainly the

statute of limitations is over, but it

898

:

still makes for a doggone good story.

899

:

And a hundred percent of whatever,

of everything that I said today

900

:

is a hundred percent true.

901

:

Kim Mueller: Thank you for sharing

your story with me and giving me

902

:

an opportunity to take a look at

it through the psychology eye.

903

:

Bill Alderson: Thank you,

Kim, for joining me today.

904

:

Until next time, Mr.

905

:

Non Grata, signing off.

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About the Podcast

MisterNonGrata
A podcast uncovering why bold problem solvers become unwelcome—and how leaders can turn these paradoxes into future success.
MisterNonGrata is a podcast designed to explore the paradox where problem solvers who achieve significant successes become unwelcome within organizations. Hosted by an experienced expert who has repeatedly faced this phenomenon, the podcast aims to delve deep into the underlying reasons and provide a new model for paradigm-shifting problem-solving. It seeks to help leaders transform these challenges into opportunities for future success without disparaging any individuals or organizations involved.

About your host

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Bill Alderson

Bill Alderson is a historian at heart, a storyteller by nature, and a technologist by trade. For more than four decades, he has solved some of the toughest challenges in cybersecurity and networks — from helping restore communications at the Pentagon on 9/11 to training thousands of professionals worldwide.

But beyond technology, Bill is the proud grandson of Mabel and Ed Plaskett, California pioneers who passed down stories of resilience, family, and the rugged Big Sur coast. As the family historian, he has gathered photographs, journals, and documents to preserve the heritage of the Plaskett family for future generations.

Through this podcast, Bill shares those stories — weaving together history, heritage, and personal reflections — so that listeners, whether family or friends, can connect with the enduring spirit of the Monterey County coast.